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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the All-Volunteer Force was a major and
fundamental change that affected all aspects of the way the
Armed Forces must now procure personnel. The military ser-
vices are now operating in a no-draft environment for the
first time since World War II. This unique situation has
had the effect of placing the burden of recruiting entirely
on the services to attain proper manning level requirements.
On July 1, 1973, induction authority officially expired
and at the end of Fiscal Year 197 5 the last conscripted soldier
had completed his required service (Schlesinger , 1974) . The
decision to end peacetime conscription in the United States
and to rely instead entirely on volunteers to meet the man-
power needs of the Armed Forces must be considered as one of
the most crucial and controversial defense policies undertaken
in recent years.
President Richard M. Nixon, in announcing his decision
to proceed with the All-Volunteer Force, acknowledged the
national controversy surrounding the issue of discontinuing
the draft (Marmion, 1971) . Nevertheless, the military depart-
ments were called upon to begin planning for sustaining sus=-
taining their manpower requirements on a volunteer basis and
a special commission was formed to study the problem and to
develop "... a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription
and moving towards an All-Volunteer Force." (President's Com-
mission, 1970, p. 211) .
8

'^»V*i>*A. * PROBLEM ^ «,
One of the major effects of the draft was to remove the
military from forces of the recruiting marketplace. In a
draft environment, the military could afford to be dominated
by traditions that often ran counter to the general thrust
of changes in the civilian environment. The draft ensured
an adequate supply of manpower. The removal of the draft com-
pels the military to compete directly with civilian industry
for qualified personnel. The Armed Forces must now be respon-
sive to changes in the civilian environment and must focus on
making enlistment competitively attractive in order to attract
sufficient numbers of qualified personnel at a cost the American
public is willing to bear.
During the draft, there was no apparent need to improve
the supply of manpower accessions into the services. However,
with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force there were many ad-
justments that needed to be made in the recruiting process in
order to monitor the factors that influence service age indivi-
duals to choose military service rather than alternative
civilian pursuits.
The Report of the President's Commission on an All-
Volunteer Armed Force supports the importance of the recruit-
ing effort in maintaining the quality of an All-Volunteer Force.
"... The Commission recognizes the importance of
recruiting and retaining qualified individuals.
Improvements, combined with an intensive recruit-
ing effort, should enable the military to maintain
a high quality force." (p. 18).

However, the recruiting establishment in the past has
been a small, comparatively stable body accustomed to perform-
ing traditional duties in traditional ways. The unchanging
nature of recruiting was described in this way:
"Traditional recruiting methods with some excep-
tions, have not significantly changed over the
past 100 years. Appeals popular in the 19th
century are still in use today." (Broadening the
Recruiting Market, 1972, p. 1)
.
There is general agreement that the difficulties for
sustaining the All-Volunteer Force will increase after 198
and become more severe after 1985 because of the sharp de-
cline in the population of military age males and forecasted
increases in private sector competition for employable youth.
Furthermore, the future recruiting situation may be less
bright. In a statement before the Subcommittee on Manpower and
Personnel, Professor King stated that:
"The All-Volunteer Force has been operating under
a combination of circumstances which could not
reasonably be expected to ever be more favorable."
(Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 7)
.
This previous statement directly relates to the absence
of a draft-guaranteed supply of qualified personnel into the
military service. As a result, further analysis is deemed
essential concerning certain issues of major importance and
their potential consequences.
The following issues are linked with the recruiting pro-
cess and the ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force con-
cept in the United States.
10

1. A 40% force level decline from the peak of the Viet-
nam War significantly reduced recruiting requirements, while
a relatively stable force level is now expected to be main-
tained for marginal national security.
2. The prime recruiting targets exist in the 17- and 18-
year-old male population. However, this population will con-
tinue to steadily decline into the early 1990' s as much as
25% from 2.15 million to 1.6 million.
3. Record unemployment levels, especially among the
teenage group now estimated at 19% and among blacks at 3 6.9%
are expected to considerably improve due to a 50% decrease in
unemployment forecast for 1982.
4. The substantial pay increases in real military recruit
pay relative to real civilian pay for comparable jobs of 193%
to 11% will see greater parity or be reversed in the future
(Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 7).
5. The future supply of military manpower becoming more
speculative and subject to seasonal variations.
6. The principal qualitative procurement objectives
of the services to maintain or improve upon the pre-All Volun-
teer Force standards.
7. The traditional and largely self-imposed limitations
on potential recruits in relation to women and black represen-
tation.
8. The supply of volunteers will tend to distribute itself





These factors portend a very grave recruiting problem
for the military in the near future. With a smaller source
of supply, the services will need to attract one of every four
males instead of the previously projected six to reach re-
cruiting goals. BJLinkin points out that:
"While it should remain possible to meet the
quantitative requirements, the quality of man-
power will surely suffer. However, difficulties
may develop even before this supply problem is
encountered. As the economy continues to re-
cover, the number of male high school graduates
drawn to the military is likely to reach disturb-
ingly low levels." (Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 18).
The aforementioned problem appears to spiral at a much
greater rate when Professor Morris Janowitz discusses the
concept of "postwar erosion of Nationalism." In essence,
this feature relates to societal attitudes concerning the
validity of the mass armed force and the effectiveness of
our military institutions during the Vietnam War (New Yorker,
1975, Vol. I, p. 59) . This evolution of anti-military senti-
ment makes it considerably more difficult and subsequently
places greater emphasis and importance on recruiting qualified
individuals interested in military service. As a result, a
smaller force was determined to be sustained primarily by the
prevailing socio-economic pressures that emerged during this
period.
At no other time in our history has a peacetime military
had to cope with so many changes in the way it deals with its
most important resource, people. The process of change, which
12

began in the 1960's, is likely to accelerate in the near future
as new policies and procedures are instituted.
Already there have been fundamental changes within the
military. Paramount among these changes are the elimination
of the draft, the reduction in defense personnel and budgets,
and the increasing costs of personnel in relation to the re-
cruitment function. In addition, a declining civilian man-
power pool, and new attitudes towards the military in Congress
and among the general population in the wake of the Vietnam
War have created a new environment in which the military must
now operate. The American military have already begun to adapt
to changes in the personnel environment, but more change is re-
quired. The challenge for the armed forces is to maintain a
broad-based organization that can attract young people (Cooper
and Rostker, 1974)
.
In a managerial sense, the elimination of the draft was
a major shock. The draft had set up many internal behavioral
and organizational responses that subsequently needed to be
altered in a zero draft atmosphere. As a result, the need for
analyzing the socio-economic factors which affect military en-
listments of non-prior service eligible youths directly bear
upon the recruiting situation.
Research into the area of recruiting the All-Volunteer
Force indicate that certain socio economic factors prevail
and that the servcies need to adopt changes in the accession
and procurement process if they wish to remain a viable
13

All-Volunteer Force. It becomes evident that the recruiting
process has and will become more important and vital for the
success of the All-Volunteer Force to be realized.
B. PURPOSE
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis will be to investi-
gate the importance of socio-economic factors in recruiting
and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept.
C. SCOPE
This thesis is primarily based on a comprehensive litera-
ture review of government publications, technical reports,
research papers, Department of Defense official documents,
books, magazine articles, and various unpublished papers.
The bibliography of this thesis has been expanded to in-
clude as many references as possible pertaining to the subject
of the transition of the United States Armed Forces from a
_draft environment to one of all volunteers. U
The U. S. Defense Manpower Commission in its report
dated April 19, 197 6, states:
"The prospects for sustaining DOD annual require-
ments for new enlisted manpower from 1976 through
1985 will be affected by the dominant demographic,
economic, and social conditions prevailing during
the next decade." (Defense Manpower Commission,
1976, p. 386)
.
At this time, the recruiting effort is principally con-
cerned with the enlistment aged population in attaining quali-
tative, quantitative, and representational factors of armed
forces enlistment standards. In addition, the attitudes of
14

youth towards military service, educational and training
opportunities, and military compensations and benefits are
vital in recruiting an all-volunteer force.
It is pertinent to discuss the methods of averting poten-
tial recruiting shortfalls by altering enlistment standards,
occupational selection standards, potential supply of women
accessions, military compensation, training programs, and
increasing the degree of fate control and self-determination.
Accordingly, these changes can increase the size of the
applicant pool by inducing additional men and women to seek
enlistment who would not apply otherwise.
The format of this thesis pursues these essential ele-
ments so that one can logically understand the concepts and
underlying influences in procuring potential candidates into
the military service.
Therefore, Chapter Two primarily relates the historical
background of the draft through the transition of volunteerism.
Chapter Three deals with enlistment standards and the aspects
of quality, quantity, and the representational mix. Chapter
Four reviews certain socio-economic factors which influence
enlistment, while Chapter Five explores incentives enhancing
enlistment into the military service. Finally, the conclusion
focuses on the socio-economic factors that directly bear upon
recruiting practices and procedures. Additionally, it empha-
sizes the need for larger advertising budgets and expanded re-
cruiter forces that provide an effective and more flexible




This chapter presents a detailed history of conscription
particularly in the United States. It primarily focuses on
the emergence of conscription as a solution to the problem
of military manpower procurement until the inception of the
All Volunteer Armed Force.
The word conscription is basically a derivative of the
Latin expression "conscribes milites" (to enroll soldiers)
.
Conscription is one of two methods of securing manpower to
be trained and formed into a national soldiery. The other
method is recruitment. In military history, a sharp distinc-
tion can not be made between recruitment and conscription.
Where conscription has existed, volunteering has been per-
mitted to anticipate conscription.
Wars in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
centuries were primarily fought by professional armies. How-
ever, the draft was relied upon during great national crises.
The first modern conscription law was adopted by France during
the French Revolution. In 1793, voluntary military service
produced only one-third the number of men considered necessary
for defense of the new democracy. As a result, Napoleon led
an army primarily manned by conscription. Accordingly, most
major European nations adopted this practice of conscription
during the nineteenth century (Carleton, Jan. - June 68)
.
In the "New World," the Colonialist fought as necessary
to protect his interests and well being. The militia concept
16

stemmed from this feature. This meant that every able-bodied
person should be armed and ready to fight when the occasion
demanded such action. In Jamestown from 1607 until 1775, when
the American Revolution began, conscription of one type or ano-
ther was promulgated in a number of laws and ordinances. In
the Revolutionary War voluntary enlistments failed to supply
the needed manpower. Various types of bounties were adopted
as inducements to enlistment. These included large sums of
money, clothing and 100 acres of land. In 1777, Massachusetts
and Virginia resorted to conscription. By February, 1778,
only about two-thirds of the authorized Continental Army had
been recruited and General Washington recommended to the Con-
tinental Congress that the necessary men be obtained by uni-
versal conscription throughout the colonies (Little, 1969)
.
After the American Revolution, a militia law was passed
by Congress requiring all free males between the ages of 18
and 4 5 to participate in military training. However, no offi-
cers nor equipment were provided and only four days of train-
ing were required. Therefore, the law had little impact upon
the nation and in 1903 it was repealed. Voluntary enlistment
was again inadequate in the War of 1812.
Conscription was used in a limited manner in this country
until the Civil War. The Confederate States instituted con-
scription in 1862. The northern states adopted a conscription
registration law on March 3, 1863. Serious problems were
encountered in the north primarily due to the administration
17

of the system. The law was selectively enforced, being ap-
plied only to areas where volunteering had lagged. In addi-
tion, there were many exemptions in the Union system whereby
an individual could avoid service if he could provide a sub-
stitute or would pay the government three hundred dollars to
purchase "freedom." This first drawing of names in 1863 was
accompanied by riots. Within a few months, ninety-eight re-
gistrars were murdered by mobs and severe property damage
occurred. As a result, troops had to be withdrawn from the
front to put down the draft riots in New York City.
After the Civil War, the United States had no draft and
did not reinstitute the system until after entry into World
War I. The Selective Service Act was prepared and presented
to Congress the day after war was declared in April, 1917.
The Selective Service Act of 1917, in contrast with the 1863
law, was carefully drawn in light of the previous experience.
Exemptions were allowed only for married men and men in essen-
tial work categories. Nevertheless, a bitter six-week debate
ensued in which the bill was alleged as being unconstitutional.
In May of 1917 the act was passed by Congress. The law was
enforced uniformly and without discrimination. The draft
order number was determined by chance and administration of
it was controlled by local and state boards. As a result,
24 million Americans between the ages of 17 and 45 were
registered for the draft and more than 2.8 million men were
selected and inducted into the service. This compares with
18

1.6 million men who volunteered, many when their compulsory
induction seemed imminent. This law was so successful that
it required only three minor revisions during its period of
applicability (Lockmiller, 1955) . The draft was again elim-
inated at the conclusion of the war.
However, planning for future emergencies began in 1926,
when the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee con-
vened. The Committee proposed "An Act to provide for the
common defense by increasing the personnel of the Armed Forces
of the United States and providing for its training" which
called for the registration of all males between the ages of
21 and 35.
In response to the war in Europe, the Congress passed the
first peacetime draft law in the history of the United States
in 1940. Mandatory registration of all males between the ages
of 21 and 35 was required and drafted men were to serve a
period of one year. On August 18, 1941, Congress extended the
period of service to 18 months. America's entrance into World
War II extended the length of service for the duration of the
war plus six months. Registration was broadened to include
men between the ages of 18 and 60. During the period of emer-
gency from November 1940 to October 31, 194 6, there had been
nearly 22 million registrants between the ages of 18 and 37
with more than 10 million men inducted into military service.
On June 25, 1946, Congress extended conscriptive service
to July 1, 1947. At that time, Congress passed a law which
19

provided for the retention of a nucleus of Selective Service
personnel for protection against national emergencies. Thus,
the United States depended solely upon enlistemnts for main-
taining the posture of the services. The United States was
without conscription, however, for only one year. Although
the draft ended and a general demilitarization was initiated,
Americans soon realized that military preparedness was a ne-
cessity in a shrinking world, where a surprise attack was an
ever-increasing possibility.
Although an attempt was made to man the Armed Forces with
volunteers during this period, it was considered a failure in
force quality as well as total numbers. The failure is not
surprising in view of the attitudes regarding military service
which existed in the Nation at the conclusion of a great and
costly war.
For four years President Truman tried unsuccessfully to
have Congress pass a Universal Military Training Act which
would provide one year of training to all American men. This
issue always fostered bitter debate, but the Cold War crisis
forced the Congress to enact the Selective Service Act on
June 24, 1948.
The 1948 Act provided for a period of service of 21 months.
All men between the ages of 18 and 26 were required to register.
The law provided that high school students could continue their
study, if their work was satisfactory, until graduation, or
until they reached the age of 20, whichever was first. Youths
20

in the 18-year-old category were allowed to enlist for one year
(limit of 161,000 per year) and avoid the draft by joining the
reserves for six years. College and University students could
have induction postponed until the end of the academic year.
Each month the draft call was calculated to yield the number
of men required to sustain the military forces at the levels
authorized by Congress. The authorized level was 2,000,882
men, but subsequent budget cuts forced successive reductions
in authorized military strength.
After January 194 9 the Armed Forces were able to attain
the required manpower level and draft calls were cancelled,
but registration and classifications continued. The value of
this continuation of registration and classification paid off
when inductions were forced to resume within 6 days after the
Korean hostilities began.
The Selective Service Act of 1948 was succeeded by the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 30, 1951.
This Act increased the sources of manpower available for in-
duction by restricting certain deferments and extending the
service period from 21 to 24 months. The Universal Military
Training and Service Act was extended in June 1955 until July,
1959. A further extension until July 1, 1967, was granted by
Public Law 88-2.
In March 1969, President Nixon appointed the Gates Com-
mission to develop a comprehensive plan to eliminate the draft.
The chairman was Thomas S. Gates who had once been Secretary
21

of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration. As an independent
public advisory body with its own staff of 16 members, the
Gates Commission examined all aspects of the All-Volunteer
Force issue from a fresh and unbiased perspective. In Novem-
ber 1969, the President reduced the period of prime draft vul-
nerability from seven years to one year and established draft
selection by lottery. In Febraury 1970, after a year of inten-
sive study, the commission concluded that:
"We unanimously believe that the nation's interest will
be better served by an All-Volunteer Force, supported
by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force
of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be
taken promptly to move in this direction; and, that
the first indispensable step is to remove the present
inequity in the pay of men serving their first term
in the Armed Forces." (Report of Pres. Comm. , 1970,
p. 8) . .
The commission's comprehensive report was a significant
contribution to the public's understanding of a complex de-
fense issue and to foster broad acceptance of the All-Volunteer
Force concept. There was a consensus in the conclusions of
the Gates Commission regarding the feasibility of the AVF and
the principal steps needed to end reliance on the draft. The
commission recommended:
1. Substantial pay increases for junior enlisted personnel.
2. Selected pay increases for junior enlisted personnel.
3. Selected pay incentives for specialists.
4. A greatly expanded recruiting program.
(Report of Pres. Comm., P. 10).
22

Thus, in October 1970, the Secretary of Defense directed
the military to move toward an All-Volunteer Force with 1 July
1973 set as the target date for achievement. In January 1971,
the President proposed that induction authority be extended to
30 June 1973, due to the Vietnam War. In September 1971, the
Congress, after lengthy debate, extended the President's in-
duction authority to 1 July and passed legislation on pay and
benefits for an AVF. In October 1972, the Secretary of Defense
reported that DOD was within reach of achieving an AVF of 2.3
million active duty and 1 million Reserves. As a result, by
January 1973, draft calls under the Selective Service System
ended, and on 1 July 1973 the President's power to conscript
young men had expired. Thus, America became the first major
world power to rely entirely on "volunteer ism" to man a mili-
tary "force in being" of over two million for its defense and




This chapter presents the enlistment standards to be
used as the goals of this nation and of the Department of De-
fense to build a credible All Volunteer Force (AVF) . The
creation of that credible force is based on a number of cri-
tical factors. The first of several major factors is that
adequate numbers of citizens must volunteer for military ser-
vice to properly man a large standing Armed Force. The
second is that these volunteers must possess the desired
qualitative factors necessary for the maintenance of a credible
force that is capable of decisive military action in support
of national security objectives. The third is that these vo-
lunteers attain a proper balance of male, female and racial
representation. These factors must necessarily be viewed in
the present fiscal environment in which The Armed Services
plan and program its combat forces.
Adjustments in procurement programs have been made
throughout the Armed Services in order to meet its annual
enlisted recruiting goals from a quantity standpoint with
seemingly no sacrifice of quality in the process. These are
a variety of reasons for this success. Obviously, increased
financial incentives for enlistees, lower procurement ob-
jectives, and increased emphasis on enlisting women are
key factors.
Partial success to date is related intimately with the




Studies show that people enlist to learn a skill that will
be useful to them in civilian life, to continue their educa-
tion, to test their abilities and define their interests,
to find adventure, challenge and maturity, and to serve
their country (Bowers and Bachman, 1974, p. 21).
Rising unemployment and an uncertain economy have helped
recruiting goals set by all of the Services. A sagging econo-
my represents an opportunity to be a great deal more selective
t/
in accepting men and women for enlistment.
Although there have been major organizational, manpower
and program changes, and even changes in the image of recruiters
in the eye of the public over the years, the recruiting mission
has essentially remained the same. However, many people, mili-
tary and civilian, have no appreciation or understanding of the
complexity of the recruiting business and the role of the re-
cruiter and the formidable task he performs. Simply, the mis-
sion of the Recruiting System is to recruit and select quali-
fied personnel from the civilian community to satisfy the man-
power needs and objectives of the Armed Forces. As a result,
the study is limited to an analysis of the system for recruit-
ing ncn-prior-service enlisted personnel only.
While many studies have been accomplished on the general
subject of recruiting in an all volunteer environment, they
were written prior to or during the transition period. Ac-
cordingly, these studies only address the basic issue of
25

whether the military could continue to procure manpower with-
out the draft and do not directly deal with the factors men-
tioned earlier.
Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, it is assumed
that the economic conditions in the United States will improve
to the point where the youth of America are once again in de-
mend for employment by both the military and civilian communi-
ties. David Cortright expresses the impact of current economic
conditions. "... The deepest economic slump and highest rate
of unemployment since the Great Depression have caused a surge
of new enlistees and have neatly 'solved' the problem of the
all-volunteer force." (Military Establishment, June 1975, p.
43) .
It is assumed that the all-volunteer force policy will
continue and that a return to stable economic conditions and
better employment opportunities will not warrant reinstatement
of conscription.
It is assumed that military pay, benefits and educational
opportunities will continue at the present high comparative
level with civilian occupations. The importance of educational
incentives as an ingredient critical to the success of high
quality all-volunteer force was summarized by Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Education) Dr. M. Richard Rose:
"Educational and training incentives more strongly
attract high school graduates and those with higher
school grades than do financial incentives.
"Educational and training opportunities attract
equally from all races those individuals with
26

higher educational levels as well as higher academic
performance. These incentives hold no racial bias.
"Educational and training opportunities are pri-
mary incentives to re-enlistment and correlate
highly with career satisfaction." (Statistical
Review, 1974, p. 10). It
Rose states that "... The educational and training
incentives operate optimally only when such major irritants
as low pay are removed." (p. 11) It is assumed that the
political situation of the United States will continue to
demand a mix of highly competent tactical and strategic
forces capable of successful operations in all spectrums
of warfare.
A. BACKGROUND
The military services have been administering some sort
of aptitude testing for many years. Screening of enlistees
and inductees for minimum mental ability was first introduced
into the armed services in August 1942. Existent literacy
standards were waived to permit men who possessed sufficient
intelligence to assimilate military training the opportunity
to serve even though some were illiterate.
"Screening tests during W.W. II were used to select
men on the basis of very low mental standards, i.e.,
those who did not possess sufficient literacy or
mental ability to absorb .the most elementary train-
ing. However, this experience emphasized the value
of screening on the basis of mental ability — a
practice which continued after the war when higher
mental standards could be applied." (Uhlaner, 1952,
p. 3).





Following World War II, personnel testing programs were
given the necessary attention. Each branch of the service
developed its own battery of tests to determine minimum mental
suitability. "It was realized early that much waste in cost
of transportation and processing of enlistment applicants
could be avoided if those who were likely to be disqualified
for mental reasons could be detected and rejected at the local
recruiting stations before being sent to Central Examining
Stations." (Uhlaner, p. 7). This was not the case as far as
aptitude testing was concerned. Although considerable advance-
ment has been made in developing the tests, they were not ad-
ministered until after the recruit had been sent to the Central
Examining Stations. This resulted in a high rejection rate
due to little or no vocational aptitude.
Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT) were developed in
1949 by a joint subcommittee composed of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. The main objective of this subcommittee was to
develop a screening instrument which could be used by all three
services to determine acceptance or rejection of enlistees and
inductees. The mental category status of each person was de-
fined in terms of his score on the AFQT.
Nancy Guinn, of the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory,
related that due to increased demands placed on new recruits
and because of technological advances in all spheres of military
operations, it has become necessary to attract and enlist indi-
viduals who possess marginal mental ability. An important
28

relationship of the availability and demand of manpower under
differing situations can be explained in the following way:
"During periods of reduced international military
involvement, increased selectivity is feasible be-
cause the drain on national manpower resources is not
excessive. However, with the occurrence of war or
national emergency, the requirement for military
manpower becomes highly demanding. The Selective
Service Law requires that the services accept any
registrant who achieves a percentile score of 10 or
higher on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, re-
gardless of educational level or aptitude test
scores." (Guinn, 1970, p. 2).
In addition, by 1965. . . "the increases in selectivity
for enlistment had introduced such high mental standards
that the Armed Forces were deferring substantial numbers of
personnel in the available manpower pool. The majority of
these individuals, classified as Category IV on the basis of
an AFQT score, between the 10th and 3 0th percentiles, were
being rejected because they failed to qualify on supplementary
tests or did not possess the necessary educational prere-
quisites." (Guinn, 1970, p. 1).
In October 1966, in response to a request made by President
Johnson, the Department of Defense lowered mental standards
for accepting men into military service. This effort was
named "Project 100,000" after its goal to recruit 100,000 men,
who previously would have been rejected because of failure to
meet minimum mental standards or, in some instances, physical
standards. The purpose of Project 100,000 was to give to a
broader segment of the Nation's youth the opportunity to serve
in the country's defense and, at the same time, to improve
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their competence and prepare them for a more productive life
upon return to civilian status. Project 100,000 was terminated
in 1972.
B. ASVAB TESTING
The concept behind the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) actually dates back to 1958. This test is used
to determine mental and aptitude qualifications which are vital
to enlistment eligibility. It was then that the Armed Ser-
vices first started testing high school students for vocational
aptitude. It proved to be a very valuable recruiting tool,
because it provided the recruiters with a list of prospective
enlistees who have a measurable vocational aptitude.
"The program was very successful. So successful, in
fact, that the other services joined by initiating
their own programs and soon there was a lively com-
petition among recruiters to place their service's tests
in a given school. This competition became detrimental
to the total recruiting program and the schools could
not and would not allocate the time necessary to admini-
ster the test for each service. In addition, school
administrators in some schools were turned anti-test,
anti-military, and anti-recruiting by some unscrupulous
acts and conduct." (Procedures Manual, 1974, p. 1-1,2).
This action prompted the Assistant Secretary for Defense
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to direct the military de-
partments to explore the feasibility of developing a common
aptitude battery. In 1966, a group of experts from the Army
Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, the
Navy Personnel and Training Research Laboratory, and the Air
Force Human Resources Laboratory developed a prototype test.




Tests were developed to serve as both an instrument for
counseling high school students by school administrators and
as a military recruitment aid that would: (1) establish
mental qualifications for enlistment and induction; (2) permit
selection of enlistment aptitudes for particular occupational
or training systems; and (3) provide classification and assign-
ment information. With the exception of Coding Speed, test
items contained on the first form of the ASVAB were selected
from an item pool consisting of all items contained in the
different tests of the armed forces.
"Because of differences among the services in accep-
tance standards, training programs and job require-
ments, a test with known degree of validity in one
service might have reduced validity if applied in ano-
ther service. Hence, it was necessary to require high
correlation among counterpart tests if they were to be
considered to be equally effective in predicting success
in training and on the job. The scores on all the
tests were correlated with each other and statistical
adjustments made to provide stability and generalizabi-
lity to the base mobilization population." (Bayroff,
1970, p. 4)
.
ASVAB was introduced into the national high school environ-
ment in 1968 by joint service regulation which established
responsibilities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Inter-
service Recruiting Committees were formed to " . . . plan,
coordinate and maintain the relationship between local recruit-
ing and schools for testing purposes." (Bayroff, p. 3). This
was intended to mold the testing of all the services into a
united front; however, the services acted independently and
skirted DOD directives. This resulted in a revised directive
in 1972 which designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the
executive agent with overall responsibility for the school
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testing program. The Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group,
with headquarters at Randolph AFB, was formed and tasked to
develop plans, policy, and procedures to implement, coordinate,
and manage the ASVAB program. (A.F. Vocational Testing Pro-
gram, 1974, p. 2)
.
1. ASVAB Content
ASVAB consists of nine tests designed to measure apti-
tude in five separate vocational-technical areas.
General-Technical — describes the student's ability
for occupations requiring academic ability. The
composite is composed of verbal and mathematical
components of the battery.
Clerical — describes the student's ability relevant
to clerical and administrative occupations. The
composite is composed of the battery components
concerned with verbal ability and clerical speed and
accuracy.
Electronics — describes student's ability relevant
to electrical and electronic occupations. The com-
posite consists of tests dealing with electrical
information and with understanding of mechanical
principles.
General Mechanics — describes student's ability in
terms of those capabilities relevant to a variety of
mechanical and trade jobs. The composite consists
of tests assessing shop information and spatial
ability.
Motor Mechanics — describes the student's ability
relevant to engine repair and other related jobs.
It is composed of measures of automotive informa-
tion and understanding of mechanical principles.
(Counselor Manual, 1974, p. 17).
Individual tests consist of twenty-five questions except
Coding Speed, which has 100. All tests are timed. Actual test-




The Armed Forces use the results of the nine tests and
compute aptitude composites slightly different than the pre-
viously stated five vocational-technical areas which are reported
to the high school counselors and testees. The four aptitude
composites are: Mechanical, Administrative, General and Elec-
tronics.
"The Mechanical composite (M) depends upon the scores
of the subtests Tool Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehen-
sion, Shop Information and Automotive Information.
The Administrative composite (A) depends upon the
scores of the subtests Coding Speed and Word Know-
ledge and Arithmetic Reasoning, Space Perception,
and Electronics Info." (Procedures Manual, p. 6-2).
Generally, the Armed Forces will accept mental Category
I and II applicants without high school diplomas, but applicants
scoring in Category III or IV must possess a diploma. Also, very
few mental Category IV people are allowed to enlist. Furthermore,
all General Education Development Certificates must be state-
certified.
3. ASVAB Reliability
The reliability of a test is an index of the consistency
with which it measures (i.e., the extent to which repeated admini-
stration of the test will repeat the same results) . Measure-
ment errors may be introduced by such things as the length of
the test. "A test may be too short and so give an inadequate
sampling of the attribute being measured. It may be so long
that the test-taker becomes bored and begins to answer to ran-
dom." (Strauss, 1972, p. 426).
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Among the techniques used to determine test reliability
is checking to see if slightly different versions of a test
given to the same people at different times, or the same test
given to matched samples of people, give the same approximate
results. The reliability of ASVAB was determined by use of an
internal consistency index computed through use of the Kuder-
Richardear Formula 20 and through correlation with an alternate
form of the test.
C . QUALITY
People must be recruited in the quality necessary to suc-
cessfully fulfill the mission of the Armed Forces. However,
there are no permanent solutions in determining manpower needs.
As Defense requirements, technology, and budgetary constraints f
change, so will needs and the ways of meeting tnem (Falk,
1966, p. 124) . Accordingly, DOD plannersantl programmers must
be attuned to a myriad of internal and external factors which
could impact on recruiting.
"Mental test standards are established by law and
military policy as a means of determining acceptabi-
lity of potential enlistees and inductees. The pur-
pose of such standards is to screen out those who
cannot profit from military training and who might
be actual liabilities to the Services." (Uhlaner,
1952, p. 1)
.
Quality recruiting is and must continue to be the goal of
the United States Armed Forces. The supply of qualified people
limits success of meeting National objectives just as sharply
as does the supply of money or materials.
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The Armed Forces measure quality through the use of several
criteria such as moral, physical and mental standards. Since
the advent of the AVF, however, there has been a tendency to
expand the general meaning of quality to include other factors
such as social, economic, and racial representativeness of the
Armed Forces. Indeed, the issue of representativeness has been
argued for years by professional scholars such as Samuel P.
Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and others, but it did not become
a major item of professional or academic interest as long as
conscription remained in effect. The peacetime draft, in all
probability, did provide a reasonably balanced cross-section of
American youth for military service. Additionally, the selec-
tivity of conscription enabled the services to maintain a rea-
sonably high level of quality as measured by aptitude and educa-
tional achievement. However, termination of the draft raised
serious questions about the availability and extent of quality
in an AVF. For example, during the first meeting of a newly
organized Senate Sub-Committee on Manpower and Personnel, its
Chairman, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, stated that the issue of
quality in the AVF:
"... does not simply go to the question of IQ, or the
educational level of the new soldiers. Quality includes
the whole spectrum of questions on the representative-
ness, the motivation, and the patriotism, as well as
the skill of our armed force personnel." (OASD, M&RA,
Dec. 1974).
Most of the issues raised by Senator Nunn are complex and




In examining the quality of enlistees, one should logi-
cally first try and determine a suitable military concept or
definition of quality and a satisfactory means of measurement.
Extensive research on the subject suggests that it is an am-
biguous term at best and that no fully satisfactory measure
exists. However, people are not hesitant to discuss the issue.
For instance, Assistant Secretary of Defense, William K. Brehm,
in writing on the quality of recruits stated:
"Quality is a complex concept. Its many facets
include physical capacity, moral behavior, trainabi-
lity, intelligence, and most importantly—motivation
and discipline. The services try to measure all of
these things before an individual is signed up, to
predict whether or not he will be successful. At
present, some 31 percent of the males in the military
age group are ineligible for service." (COMM. DIGEST
1974, p. 2)
.
More often than not, however, quality is referred to strictly
in terms of educat ion Legal , m"" 1-31 category and aptitude. There
are many illustrations as to what constitutes quality, but per-
haps none quite as straight forward as conveyed in a status
report released by the Directorate of Personnel Plans in Febru-
ary 1974. The report stated "two yardsticks most frequently
used to assess the quality of enlistees are standardized test
scores and level of education, whether or not the enlistees
have completed high school." (Transition of AVF, 1974, p. 16).
Bliven states:
"In 1964, when the recruits were both volunteers and
draftees, the percentage of high school graduates was
sixty-eight. In 1975, the overall percentage was
seventy-two." (New Yorker, 1975, Vol. I, p. 56).
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When recession began, the military's qualification stan-
dards were fairly high. However, they have been getting
higher. Volunteers are not accepted until they have satis-
factorily taken the ASVAB. This was not the process taken
during the draft years. As a result, average scores are higher
than ever before because the services are becoming more selec-
tive.
Accordingly, mental category, education and aptitude are
critical enlistment criteria affecting recruiting procedures.
Education is easy enough to understand, but it should prove
helpful to explain mental qualification and job aptitude. Ob-
viously, the degree of aptitude and educational achievement
found in the AVF are quantifiable and easily compared to earlier
periods of the draft.
Until fairly recently, the Armed Services used the Armed ^"\
Forces Qualification test to determine mental group designation
and skill aptitude. The AFQT basically measured arithmetic
reasoning, word and tool knowledge, and pattern analysis. The
Armed Services now use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery to measure these results.
Based on these test scores, examinees are divided into
groupings according to mental qualifications. The mental group
category terminology common throughout the Department of Defense





Mental Category Percentile Score
I 93 to 100
II 65 to 92
III 31 to 64
IV 10 to 30
V 9 and below
Categories I and II are considered to be above average,
Category III average, and Categories IV and V below average.
Category V personnel are exempt from military service by law.
As stated earlier, the end of the draft required the Armed
Forces to revitalize its recruiting effort. Quality standards
were fairly rigid in 1973. However, this was basically attri-
buted to the smaller procurement objectives of the services.
In brief, the following enlistment eligibility criteria
were iterated:
a. Mental Category I and II personnel may be high
school graduates or non-high school graduates.
b. Mental Category III and IV personnel must be
high' school graduates.
c. All enlistees, regardless of category or level of
education must achieve at least:
(1) The minimum qualifying aptitude score for the




(2) A minimum score of forty-five in the area mea-
suring general aptitude, and
(3) A minimum composite aptitude score of 170.
The latter point represents a significant change and it
applies to both male and female applicants. Certainly the re-
cruiters' job will become much more difficult as a result of
these changes and ultimately the key to success in the recruit-
ing effort.
During the transition phase and the first two years of the
AVF, measured aptitude changed significantly, but not for the
better. The trends indicate decreases in the above and below
average categories, as shown in the following table.
Table 2
AFQT COMPARISONS; TRANSITION PHASE AND AVF
1970 1974 Percent Change
I 5.3 2.1 60.4 decrease
II 28.3 23.1 18.4 decrease
III 41.7 58.9 41.2 increase
IV 24.1 16.1 33.3 decrease
(OASD, M&RA, DEC. 1974).
One could argue from these figures that overall quality is
becoming more average, but comparison of the AVF with previous
conscript force indicates that a better quality mix was ob-
tained during the draft.
A greater disparity would be obvious except for the inclu-
sion of females in the CY74 figures. By law, female entrants
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must possess a high school education and attain aptitude scores in
Categories I - III. Since they presently are estimated to ac-
count for 8.9 percent of all enlisted accessions, inclusion of
their scores raised the 1974 percentages to some extent and dis-
torts the quality comparison. Moreover, the higher entrance
requirements for females accounts for part of the Category IV
improvement. Although the decrease in Category IV accessions is
quite impressive, it also becomes an undesirable aspect. The
Department of Defense possesses the viewpoint that:
"... the learning capacity of new entries is
adequate in meeting job requirements when the pro-
portion of Mental Group IV personnel does not ex-
ceed about 22 percent. Conversely, when the overall
proportions of Mental Group IV personnel drops below
15 percent, there is a tendency toward many people
underchallenged by their job assignment." (SASC,
FY 1975, p. 1481)
.
Not withstanding this phenomenon, the AVF clearly is obtain-
ing less above average and more average recruits for the Army at
precisely the time when technological requirements demand more
quality. Moreover, the complexity of weapon systems for battle-
field use is growing at such a rate that soon the Army will re-
quire the degree of technological expertise in its combat arms
elements that formerly was required only by the more technically
oriented services. Technological demands, therefore, will ex-
acerbate the existing quantitative and qualitative dilemma of
ground combat forces.
The downward trend in quality takes on added significance
when related to the quantitative factor. It is reasonable to
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assume, for example, that the services, recruiting during a
period when unemployment is extraordinarily high, will take the
most qualified who apply. Under more normal economic conditions,
however, it will be virtually impossible for the services to main-
tain current aptitude levels. To illustrate the enormity of the
problem, the Brookings Institution has calculated that even if
Category IV accessions increase to 15 percent, the services
must recruit two out of every five (or 4 percent) of every
qualified and available male in Category I-III before he reaches
age 23 (Blinkin, 1973) . Since the services currently are rea
cruiting only seven percent in Category IV, the present ac-
cessions in Categories I-III must exceed, by a substantial
amount, 4 percent of the national availability. This situa-
tion highlights the relationship between supply and the quality
of volunteers.
When the Army recruited only 8 6.9 percent of its NPS male
accessions during June-December 1973, 20.8 percent were in
Category IV. Quality was so uncertain during those first
months of the AVF that Congress attached a rider to the De-
fense Appropriation Act for FY 1974.
In essence, certain military members would be honorably
discharged, if they failed to achieve performance standards or
adapt to Army life. By mid-1974 the Army found it necessary
to discharge approximately 1,000 enlistees per month under the
program, which amounted to about 7.3 percent of total monthly
accessions. Additionally, the Army discovered that average
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monthly loss rates for non-high school graduates were 2.7
times greater than those with degrees and that Category IV
personnel failed at a rate 1.8 times greater than Category I-III
accessions,. (OASD, DEC. 1974) .
Thus, during the first 18 months of the AVF (January 1973
to June 1974) the Army adjusted quality standards as necessary
to avoid enormous recruiting shortfalls. When recruiting pro-
blems faded as the national economic slump began in mid-1974,
the quality problems faded also. What remains to be seen is
the ability to recruit adequate numbers, at a generally accep-
table level of quality, when the economy returns to normal.
At present, the U. S. experiment with an AVF has been in
progress for approximately five years, and evidence to date
has raised some important questions about the quality and quan-
tity for the force in the long term. It is quite evident that
the Armed Services find it difficult to recruit when nation-
wide unemployment remains below approximately 5.0 percent.
D. QUANTITY
The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, the
Gates Commission, considered the feasibility of obtaining
various voluntary force levels that ranged from 2.0 million to
3.0 million military personnel. It concluded that active duty
force levels within this range were possible if certain improve-
ments were made in military pay, conditions of military service
life, and recruiting capability. However, despite implementation
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of these recommendations, the Commission's optimistic estimates
have not fully materialized.
Although the Gates Commission did not suggest a specific mili-
tary manpower force level, a careful reading of the report indi-
cates that a tentative objective was a volunteer force level be-
tween 2.25 and 2.5 million. Indeed, a force level within this
range subsequently was recommended by Secretary of Defense Melvin
R. Laird when he requested, in February 1972, a force level at
just under 2.4 million for FY 1973- (Annual Def. Dept. Report,
FY 1973, p. 55). The force was not obtained and a series of
reductions in force level requests began. The shortfall at the
end of FY 1973 was approximately 144,000 (Manpower Statistics,
1974, p. 22) , whereupon the Secretary of Defense lowered the
manpower request to 2.33 million for FY 1974 (Annual Def. Dept.
Report FY 1974, p. 95) . Despite the reduction in the total
force objective, a further shortfall of 59,000 occurred, for a
combined shortage of over 200,000 for FY 1973 and FY 1974.
Only a modest reduction in total force objectives was set for
FY 1975 force levels, and recruitment has been sufficient to
stabilize the force at approximately 2.1 million. The follow-
ing Table demonstrates this downward trend in active duty man-




DOD ACTIVE DUTY FORCE
FY Stated Objective FY End Strength Shortfall
1973 2,396,517 2,252,810 143,707
1974 2,233,000 2,162,000 71,000
1975 2,152,000 2,129,000 23,000
(Annual Defense Department Reports; DOD Selected Manpower
Statistics)
As can be seen from the previous Table, the decrease from
FY 1973 to FY 1975 was 12.3 percent. Moreover, the FY 1974 re-
quest of 2.233 million was described as a " . . . base line
force—the minimum force that the President and Secretary of
Defense consider necessary to carry out national security ob-
jectives." (SASC, 1973). Yet a 5.9 percent reduction of that
minimum force occurred between FY 1974 and FY 1977.
Within DOD, this downward quantitative trend has had a most
serious impact on the U. S. Army. In FY 1973 the Army estab-
lished a force objective of 841,000, but ended the year with
slightly less than 801,000. In the following year the require-
ment was lowered to 8 04,000, but Army strength fell to 783,000,
its lowest strength since 1950. Since then the strength has
stabilized at about 785,000 (Manpower Statistics, FY 1973, p. 22)
This pronounced difference between stated force objectives
and actual force levels reflects, in large measure, the Army's
inability to recruit the quantity and quality mix of personnel
under a voluntary program. Moreover, some significant recruiting
44

trends are evident which suggest that the shortfalls would have
been much greater except for a heavy reliance on females, prior
servicemen, blacks, and the fortuitous circumstance of high
national unemployment. Indeed, it appears that the latter
factor may be merely postponing the possible demise of the AVF,
while reliance on females could be considered by some an innova-
tion of questionable long-term value.
E. REPRESENTATION
1. Female
A major doctrinal question exists about the role of
females in the Armed Forces, particularly because of their
rapidly increasing rate of representation. Few would deny
the ability of many females to serve in most military capaci-
ties, and indeed their contributions during World War II, both
in military service and industry, is proof enough. However,
the desirability of large numbers of females in the Armed Forces
as a matter of policy clearly is another matter.
The services must recognize that in many respects fe-
males constitute an extremely valuable resource for supplying
personnel to a shrinking manpower pool. However, they should
not be overly utilized by what is perhaps the largest organi-
zational segment of American society, the Armed Forces. If a
majority of females join the Armed Forces to acquire skills
and training for later use in civilian life, then one could




reasoning is diametrically opposed to the concept of limited
personnel turnover in an AVF, which of necessity must be kept
low to justify the high financial cost of a volunteer force.
On the other hand, if female reenlistment rates are maintained
at levels comparable to those of males, then other problems will
become manifest.
The Army has conducted one study whcih concluded that
between 20 and 35 percent of Army positions could be filled by
females. Therefore, it may not be unrealistic to assume that
the Army would accept such levels of female representation if
threatened with severe personnel shortages. In this event, the
viability of the Army's combat potential might be seriously
weakened.
One should not conclude that these increases in female
representation are the direct result of the currently fashionable
emphasis on sexual equality. Rather, the emphasis on females
reflects a pragmatic approach to overcome the problem of male
recruitment. The Army, for example, originally planned a slight
increase in the number of females during a five-year period
from about 21,000 in FY 1973 to 24,000 by FY 1978. Nevertheless,
"... because of shortfalls in male recruiting,
increased skills opened to women and success in
female recruiting, the Army revised (its) enlisted
women, end strength goal to over 25,000 in FY 1974
and over 50,000 by the end of FY 1978." (Manpower
Req., 1975, p. XII-3)
.
Indeed, at the end of FY 1974 the Director of the
Women's Army Corps, Brigadier General M. E. Clarke, stated
emphatically that, "the Army would not have met its recruitment
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goals for that year without the increased recruitment of females.
(Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 25, 1974) . The willingness to ex-
ploit this resource has continued unabated. During the first
six months of FY 1975, the Army had recruited 126 percent of its
goal of NPS females (OASD, M&RA, 1975) . Indications are that the
figure would be higher except for the shortage of uniforms for
female recruits and lack of adequate billeting arrangements at
training bases.
In order to absorb and effectively utilize the large
influx of females, the Army, along with the other services, has
made significant changes in a vast number of occupational skills.
The traditional roles of utilization in positions such as medi-
cal and clerical have been expanded to such a degree that 93
percent of the Army's enlisted Military Occupational Skills
(MOSs) are now open to qualified female applicants. Only com-
bat related and otherwise hazardous positions are restricted to
males. Moreover, female officers are no longer restricted to
the command of female units and are eligible to command any unit
except combat or combat support (Man. Req. 1975, p. XII 3-5).
2. Racial
Less spectacular, but nonetheless significant, has been
the increased representation of Blacks in the Army since the
emergence of the AVF. Considerable research on the racial mix
of an AVF was conducted by the Gates Commission which predicted
that the racial composition of the Armed Forces would "... not
be fundamentally changed by ending conscription." (Pres. Comm.
^f \' "iU 47

1970, p. 15) . Moreover, the Commission concluded that Black
representation in the Army enlisted ranks, which stood at 12.8
percent in 1969, would not increase beyond 18.8 percent, and
that not until 1980. (p. 141-7). By 1974, however, the percentage
had increased to 22 percent and showed every indication of going
higher. Black enlistment rates had climbed to 30 percent during
1974 and Blacks were reenlisting at a rate of 52.2 percent as
opposed to 30.9 percent for Caucasians. (OASD, M&RA, March 11,
1975). Since Blacks represented approximately 11.0 percent of the
general population in the 17-44 age group, the 22 percent figure
for the Army became a matter of concern, and steps were taken
by the Secretary of the Army to slow down the Black enlistment
rate (N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974) . As a result, the percentage
of Black enlistees in the Army dramatically declined.
The successful efforts by the Army to reduce Black en-
listments starting in mid-1974 has coincided with a general in-
crease in overall male NPS enlistments, which also began in
mid-1974 and has continued to date. In part, the increases pro-
bably have resulted from several initiatives by the Army, such as
enhancing the quality and size of its recruiting force and capi-
talizing on the educational and training ambitions of many young
people.
In theory, an all-volunteer force is more competent,
with less turnover in lower ranks and a higher percentage of
reenlistments . Accordingly, these factors would relieve some
48

pressure from the recruiting process. However, the services
also needed to consider the shift towards a younger force, thus
dictating higher accession demands than previously projected.
As a result, the following chapter will address the factors which




IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING ENLISTMENT
This chapter presents certain socio-economic factors that
are prevalent in influencing an individual to enlist in the
All Volunteer Force. These socio-economic factors will include
the attitudes and perceptions of youth towards military service,
the aspects of technical training and education, and the finan-
cial incentives such as military pay.
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
Several studies in this area concluded that certain socio-
economic factors have an effect on enlistment rates. A 1972
study by the Department of the Navy, for example, indicated
that there was a positive correlation between enlistment rates
and national levels of income (Gelke and Cook, 1972, p. 63)
.
Uscher in his Enlistment Propensity Model indicated that there
was also a positive correlation between enlistment rates and
unemployment rates (Uscher, 1974, p. 9) . Additionally, the
Hause and Fisher study identified the average income for the
17 to 21 age group as a significant factor affecting enlist-
ments (Hause and Fisher, 1968, p. 13) . 5L V*4/-c^ ^£- S—-*)
Many of these pre-1973 studies indicated that many men were
motivated to enlist by the prospect of being drafted into the
Army (Eckhardt, 1973, p. 2). The Muldrow survey and the Hause
and Fisher studies were conducted during the draft era. However,
these findings may still be valid today. A review of the sa-
lient factors enumerated by these reports can possibly determine
the effects of the present no-draft atmosphere.
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Therefore, the determination of these and other socio-
economic factors may provide a substantially better method
of properly assessing the enlistment potential of individuals
willing to enlist in the Armed Forces. Accordingly, these
factors may provide new insights for affecting enlistment rates.
B. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE
It has been a guiding assumption in past research that
general perceptions about the military services will influence
an individual's attitude about enlistment.
For instance, in a survey entitled "Values, Preferences
and perceptions concerning military service," conducted by
the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michi-
gan, there was found to be a positive correlation between pro-
military sentiment and the enlistment potential into the mili-
tary service. In addition, the perception of favorable job
opportunities in the service and the military work role are
particularly strong predictors of pro-enlistment views. Other
strong predictors are the feelings of high level military influ-
— vAA"
ence over national policy, perceptions that military leaders
are quite competent, a tendency to support past actions in Viet-J %
nam, strong opposition to amnesty for those who refused to
serve in Vietnam, and support for the idea that servicemen
should obey orders without question CBachman, 1973, p. 17-26).
Among first-term enlisted men, the factors previously
mentioned relate not only to feelings, but also to plans of
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reenlistment. This lends a further note of reality that
general attifyftdes about the military services and their
mission have a bearing on enlistment behaviors.
In a study, "Impact of an All Volunteer Force upon the
Navy," the change in the volunteer rate was considered as
the draft lottery system was abolished and the all-volunteer
concept emerged. It was pointed out that young men in the
draft lottery judged their chances of being drafted as: cer-
tain to be drafted, uncertain, or certain not to be drafted
depending on their lottery number. This concept of "Perceived
Draft Vulnerability" significantly affected the young men's
attitudes toward enlistment. The study indicated that enlist-
ments tended to decrease as draft vulnerability decreased
(Gelke & Cook, 1972, p. 46).
This type of behavior becomes increasingly important in an
all volunteer force environment. Without reliance on the draft
as an inducement towards military enlistment, recruiting goals
are more difficult to attain.
The effect of shifts in the attitudes of young men and wo-
men regarding military service is subject to quantification,
but major changes could profoundly alter the prospects for sus-
taining manpower requirements. Therefore, perceptions and at-
titudes towards military service can have an enormous impact
and considerable effect upon recruiting young people.
1. Fate Control
Further research into the area of attitudes is exempli-
fied in a two-part study entitled, "A Study of Experimental
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Incentives as an influence on enlistment intention." In
general, the most attractive items in both iterations em-
phasize the importance of both perceived "fate control" and
"traditional incentives" as significant factors influencing
potential enlistment and career motivation. It was pointed
out that the interest in equitable traditional incentives
has_jiot waned, but they_are__not_enough by themselves. A de
gree of self-determination is expected as well. The study
showed that:
"Today's youth seems to place a high value upon
playing an active role in determining the shape
of his present and future activities and life
style. His view of the satisfactions offered by
life in military service are strongly condi-
tioned by what he has seen and learned, and
came to expect in civilian life. He appears
less inclined than his predecessors to passive
acceptance of arbitrary constraints upon his
personal life." CFrey, et.al., 1974, p. 52).
Accordingly, most incentives seem to be geared towards
encouraging the potential enlistee to believe that he would
not be completely under the control of the service and that
he would be able to retain personal control over important
aspects of his life. The motivational theme was also a com-
mon element in previous research (Glickman, et.al., 1973).
In addition, this outcome is consistent in showing that the
desire for self-determination and fate control are very im-
portant influences on enlistment and career motivation.
C. TECHNICAL TRAINING
A powerful incentive for enlistment in the Armed Forces
ill, the availability of various training programs, which
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effectively enable the potential recruit to trade three to four
years of his life for the acquisition of a marketable skill
that may serve him for a lifetime in civilian society. Given
the increased technological demands of both civilian industry
and the Armed Forces, it is probable that use of skill acqui-
sition as an enlistment ploy by the services will continue in-
definitely.
Exemplifying the research done on the personal factors
influencing enlistment is a 1969 U. S. Navy Recruitment Sur-
vey by T. W. Muldrow. His purpose was to determine the moti-
vational factors and their relative strength of influence on
the decision to enlist in the Navy in 196 9. Through the use
of a structured questionnaire administered to enlistees prior
to their transfer to "basic" training, it was concluded that:
"The opportunity to obtain technical training
1 and the desire to travel were most important
personal reasons influencing more than 8 0%
of the enlistees." (Muldrow, 1969, p. iii)
.
The Armed Forces, as an organization offering employment,
is viewed as part of a whole set of employers that exist in
an individual's perceptual- field, all of whom are interrelated
in terms of degree of skill and occupational transferability.
It would seem that the increasing value that young men assign
to self-actualization and meaningful control over their vocational
and personal life has not been accompanied by a devaluation of
vocational satisfactions. These concerns continue to be impor-




underlying this dimension which can be used to address the
linkage of military a^ii civilian careers and how they impact
on enlistment motivation.
There have been recent developments to provide apprentice-
ship credits for military training and experience in specific
occupations. In this way, full apprenticeship qualifications
can be attained while an individual is on active duty. This
aspect should help all segments of society.
Not all military training, however, has civilian converti-
bility and, as one might expect, not all potential recruits
are technically oriented. The services, in order to capitalize
on this non-technical element in the civilian market of military
enlistment age individuals, offer a number of methods whereby
military personnel can accomplish formal education during a
period of active duty with the services paying up to 75 percent
of the tuition cost. In addition, after discharge, forma l edu-




The Defense Manpower Commission stated:
"Military service is an ever-changing and important
profession. For a profession to be viable, the
people involved must have the opportunity to train
in the duties of the profession and to develop pro-
fessionally. The need for educational opportunities
is particularly important for the military profes-
sion, because history has demonstrated the value
of peacetime professional education of the military






A great deal of pressure has been placed on the ser-
vices to increase the quality of enlisted accessions under the
All-Volunteer Force program. One approach is to stress the
opportunity for personal development through education.
As a result, the services have expanded educational
programs within budgetary constraints. Recruiters often pub-
licize these programs so that potential candidates will be in-
fluenced towards enlistment into the military service. The
Armed Forces has long recognized that training and education
are powerful inducements in meeting recruiting goals. To
rapidly expand education programs to meet the needs of an All-
Volunteer Force, and to ensure qualified personnel were avail-
able to help members select appropriate courses of instruction,
guidance and counseling positions were established.
These programs have been well received by military mem-
bers and have improved the overall education level of the Armed
Forces enlisted structure. They are also a positive factor in
attracting good people into the Armed Forces.
D. MILITARY PAY
Military pay is a very important aspect of the viability
of recruiting an All-Volunteer Force. It is logical to expect
men and women to volunteerfo^jnilitaxy---segv±ce if bhe^Armed
Foroesjoffer__bhem_-a—decent l±sdjig__wage as defined by the Depart-
ment of Labor at any given point in time.




"To pay personnel too little is inefficient,
for even if enough personnel could be obtained
they probably would not be of the desired qua-
lity, and training and turnover costs would
increase." (Def. Man. Comm., 1976. p. 280).
A
It is a known fact that the Armed Forces pay will never
be extravagant, but it was the first-terra enlisted personnel
who had previously suffered the most severe pay inadequacy.
Between 1948 and 1970, salaries of first-terra soldiers in-
creased only about one-third as much as those of career sol-
diers. As a result, the average annual pay for a military man
during his first two years 1 service was just over half that which
a man of comparable age and education could expect to earn in
the civilian labor market. In-order to draw competent people
to the Armed Forces this major disparity between military and
civilian pay had to be overcome.
The most significant events in this area will be covered
to provide a background in the legislation which has been im-
portant in enhancing the military enlistment potential of sus-
taining an All-Volunteer Force concept.
In December 1967, after years of having military pay lag
behind civilian pay, Congress passed Public Law 90-207, which
provides a link between military pay and pay raises granted
to Federal General Schedule (GS) employees. This law insures
that a military pay keeps pace with the pay of civilian coun-
terparts.
During the period of the draft, pay philosophy seemed to
be one of significantly underpaying servicemen in the first
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two years of service. This was possibly due to considering
that period as service one was obligated to give one's coun-
try. In a report to Congress, the Comptroller General stated:
"Before 1971 the role of military compensation was
to retain and motivate careerists because the
draft insured meeting first-term requirements.
Between 1952 and the passage of Military Selec-
tive Service Act (Public Law 92-129) in 1971,
military pay levels of first-term enlisted per-
sonnel were well below those of comparable civi-
lians. Many of the increases during this period
raised only the pay of the careerists. Several
special pays and bonuses were enacted to insure
continued service of personnel with critical
skills." (GAO Report, 1973, p. 64).
Thus to eliminate its dependence on the draft, yet still
meet its overall manpower requirements, the Army in 197 was
faced with quadrupling its level of volunteer enlistments. In-
creasing the pay of first term soldiers could not in itself
achieve this necessary four-fold increase. However, it was a
prerequisite if changes within the Army were to be effective
in attracting young Americans to voluntary service.
In November of 1971, Public Law 92-129 provided major pay
increases for service members in the first two years of service.
These increases averaged 91% for enlisted personnel
.
(GAO Report,
1973). This represented a dramatic change in pay philosophy.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Kelly, in a speech in December 1971 had the following to say
about that raise:
"There is no basis for demanding that military
people subsidize the rest of the Nation by pro-
viding their labor at rates far below those which
they could receive in other occupations . . .
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It is enough that we ask them to risk their
lives for us, without imposing a financial
tax at the same time." (Commanders Digest,
1972, p. 3)
.
These two public laws have brought military pay up to a
comparable level with pay in the private sector and have made
a great contribution to the All-Volunteer Force concept.
In addition, the military pay bill submitted to Congress
in 1972 took an important step toward rectifying the pay in-
adequacies of the first-term enlisted man. For example, the
initial scale provided for what was roughly a doubling of the
pay for the new military recruit. Smaller increases were pro-
vided for those in higher grades and with longer terms of ser-
vice. In addition, the new bill provided for a significant
increase for many military members in their basic quarters
allowance.
Since the initial request submitted to Congress, five ad-
ditional pay increases have been received by the Armed Forces.
The significant raises have been directed toward base pay;
however, increases have been realized in subsistence and hous-
ing allowance as well. These actions by Congress have helped
make the Armed Forces competitive with the private sector of
our society toward attracting the quantity and quality volun-
teers needed for the Services.
1. Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate is another factor to be considered in




felt^that^n^Jjicr-ease^iir^Ehe unemployment rate would increase
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the attractiveness of enlistment as an alternative to unem-
ployment. Uscher supports this statement in his Enlistment
Propensity model.
A study conducted by Hause and Fisher developed a
theory of the supply of first-term military manpower, and
examined the differentials in alternative civilian earnings
and tastes for military service of potential first-term en-
listees by mental ability. By the use of regression analysis,
they were able to estimate the effect of military and civilian
earnings, employment opportunities, and the draft on enlist-
ment rates.
"Enlistment rates based on the total male popula-
tion age 17 to 20 appear to be significantly associ-
ated with the relative military earnings and induc-
tion rates. Enlistment rates based on male popula-
tion age 18 and 19 not enrolled in school appear to
be significantly associated with the unemployment
rate and the induction rate." (Hause and Fisher,
1968, p. xii)
.
Combining the above time series estimates with estimates
based on a cross-section sample, Hause and Fisher concluded:
"These estimates suggest that, in the absence of
a draft, a one percent increase in relative
military earnings would increase enlistment
rates around .75 percent, and a one percent in-
crease in unemployment rates would increase en-
listment rates around .20 percent; the actual
effects of these conditions may differ from
these point estimates by amounts of 50 to 100
percent." (Hause and Fisher, 1960, p. xii).
It has been suggested that the recruiting effort in an
all volunteer environment will become increasingly explicit as
additional information is obtained. However, it is apparent
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that individuals contemplating military service wish to retain
considerable control over their vocational and personal lives
and are interested in the traditional incentives of money,
opportunity for advancement and good working conditions (Korman,
1973)
.
Therefore, in order to properly analyze these factors
it would be appropriate to explore incentives which will en-
hance enlistment into the All-Volunteer Force. Accordingly,




V. ENHANCING ENLISTMENT THROUGH THE USE OF INCENTIVES
The Armed Forces need to develop better techniques to fos-
ter the appeal of military enlistment by competent personnel.
The choice of a strategy by which to influence enlistment mo-
tivation into the services has assumed increasing importance
in the All-Volunteer Force setting. However, despite this
urgent need the optimum strategy is not immediately apparent.
As a result, this chapter presents a discussion of various in-
centives which enhance different types of individuals to enlist
in military service.
The logic of incentives as a change mechanism starts with
the simple paradigm that if you offer people the opportunity
to gain specific objects or objectives which they value, they
will change their behavior in order to realize these values
and then adjust their behavior in order to maintain these va-
lues. They are crucial in both the design and utilization of
incentive change methods (Frey et. al., 1974).
The All-Volunteer Force setting deals with a great diversity
of individuals with a wide variety of needs and motives. This
clearly presents a problem in attempting to use any signle in-
centive strategy effectively. An underlying assumption is that
the incentives which are being manipulated actually represent
appreciable values and constitute a source of attraction to the
involved target population. As a result, value assumptions
attached to these employed incentives are particularly crucial.
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In this respect, under the conditions of an All-Volunteer
Force program, the success of the program depends on the in-
centives offered by the services and the perception of these
incentives by society. The incentives offered must align with
what is wanted by today's youth in order to induce this segment
of manpower into military service.
Military managers must locate and develop new intangible in-
centives. These would provide a better psychological climate
that offer the service member a larger measure of fate control
over their lives and selection of a chosen vocational skill,
training or education while in the service. In addition, seri-
ous consideration must be given to further cultivate the tradi-
tional incentives, such as pay 'and bonuses.
A. ^ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE
A survey conducted for the Department of Defense by Gilbert
Youth Research, Inc., provided insights into the motivations
and predispositions of contemporary American civilian youth
toward the military (Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Ser-
vice, April 1972)
.
The survey was considered a vehicle to continuously monitor
the beliefs and attitudes of youth. The survey also permitted
the assessment of attitude changes toward the military possibly
resulting from the reactions of youth toward new programs and
events within the Service. Such surveys are considgreduseful
to the Department of Defense because they provide a unique
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perspective from which to evaluate policy and plan optimum
recruitment.
In recent years the United States Armed Forces were faced
with the task of recovering from the problems of the Vietnam
Era coupled with the transition to the All-Volunteer Force.
The twin pressures of wide-ranging commitments and continuous
budget constraints have made it increasingly difficult to pro-
vide the satisfying incentives expected by Armed Forces person-
nel. Accordingly, certain aspects of service life discourages
many, fine young Americans from joining the Armed Services.
The Nixon Administration in its first move to try and im-
prove service morale and alleviate societal pressures of the
draft following the Vietnam War appointed the Gates Commission.
The recommendations of the Commission given specific directions
towards an All-Volunteer Force was obvious. Hence, the only
task for the Commission was to justify the transition and pro-
vide incentive methods to attract young men to a military career.
The main incentive recommended by the commission was increased
pay. This when inplemented provided initial incentives, in-
creased morale of the soldiers, and satisfied those members of
society who supported the All-Volunteer concept.
The Commissions report had little effect in raising the
low social attitude felt towards the services. Society still
maintained its low opinion of the forces, and once this atti-
tude became generally accepted, a descending spiral seemed to
take hold. The lower the value placed on the military by the
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public, the fewer good men are attracted to the forces. The
few good men in the forces, the more derogatory the opinion
of society about the military (Rosser, 1972)
.
The efforts of the Gates Commission at least attempted
to raise the morale of the soldiers, and this must have had
some effect in lowering the dissent from within the Armed
Forces.
As a result, a number of programs have been implemented in
an attempt to adjust to the social environment. A concerted
effort has been made by all the services to try and improve
the general conditions under which service personnel serve.
Unattractive living conditions, inadequate and impersonal
post services, and an atmosphere which seems to dilute the dig-
nity of the individual, serve to deter many fine people who
otherwise might choose to become soldiers.
To attract the adequate quantity and quality of military
men, the services had to provide attractive living conditions
for its members. These living conditions must afford a sense
of personal dignity and a standard of living comparable to to-
day's young people which are available through other careers.
Actions relative to the area of family housing were designed
to improve the quality and availability of family housing for
married soldiers, regardless of rank. Family housing conditions
on many Army posts were inadequate. Particularly for young
Army men, an increasing number of whom have wives and small




there remained an urgent requirement for new quarters construc-
tion and for the renovation and maintenance of currently occu-
pied old houses.
Beginning in 1973, additional measures were developed to
expedite improvements in the condition of family housing. Ano-
ther program provided mobile homes located in attractive on-
post trailer parks at a rate of 5,000 units per year to a total
of 30,000 units.
Through the years, the military has endeavored to develop
a progressively more attractive Post environment. Modern Post
Exchanges and Commissaries are being built and are adopting new
measures of management and increased inventories. The list of
measures which were undertaken was extensive. Education Center
services were expanded, shuttle bus schedules increased, and
motel facilities leased for interim guest house accommodations.
In addition, gymnasiums were rehabilitated and re-equipped,
outdoor recreational areas expanded, and administrative proces-
sing activities consolidated to streamline the business of re-
porting into and out of installations.
In many instances where an installation is some distance
from the nearest sizable town, the service member on his off-
duty time and his family are dependent on the services pro-
vided by the Post. Whether isolated or not f military installa-
tion represents the member's special community, and its quality
is a reflection of how the service cares for its people. This
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program is continuing and being upgraded on most installations
to provide the necessary ^ar-e-4eiCTr:eoaayTs service members.
1. Fate Control
In the past, enlistment into the Armed Services always
connotated a controlled environment. Individuals perceived
their fate as ultimately and very unavoidably controlled upon
enlisting in the service. At that time, the services took for
granted that the exigencies of military service left little room
for modification of past organizational practices to alter the
image in terms of more flexible decision-making, initiative-
taking and individual participation. However, serious consi-
deration has been given to organizational changes that provide
a suitable psychological atomosphere that offers members a
larger measure of personal fate control in their vocational life.
The military forces in order to be successful in re-
gaining both the soldier's and society's confidence were re-
quired to institute a coordinated systems approach to these
critical problems at the highest DOD level. In addition, evi-
dence of successful programs are also available at various
command levels.
Major efforts were undertaken to lower dissent from
within the services. At the same time, these policy changes
considerably enhanced the enlistment aged youth's perceptions
towards military service. The following examples are major
revisions at the DOD level to formerly existing doctrine.
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a. In May, 1970, the Army announced that appearance
regulations would be revised to allow slightly longer hair.
b. In April, 1970, a new emphasis on personnel pro-
blems in the Navy was attempted with the surprise appointment
of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, as Chief of Naval Operations. Zumwalt
was promoted over thirty-three other Admirals (Cortright, 1975)
.
Zumwalt, through a series of highly publicized personal mes-
sages announced the relaxation of uniform regulations, approval
of beer in the barracks, the opening of hard rock clubs, liber-
alized leave policies, and a ban on all forms of unnecessary
harrassments.
c. In the fall of 1970, the Army instituted a contro-
versial "Amnesty" program, whereby soldiers with drug problems
were encouraged to enter a rehabilitation program, with the
promise that no punitive action would be taken against parti-
cipants.
d. In December, 1970, Army Chief of Staff, General
Westmoreland, followed the Navy with directives eliminating
morning reveille, easing pass restrictions, Saturday inspec-
tions, and legalizing beer in mess halls. In addition, sol-
diers were allowed to purchase materials to decorate their
living quarters, thus fostering some further degree of indi-
viduality and self-determination.
The most far-reaching new policies attempted to intro-
duce a measure of enlisted men's participation into personnel
policies. In addition, the services 'treatment of its people
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had to be based upon the recognition that the great majority
of them are responsible and can be relied upon to perform well
because they know their leaders have placed trust and confi-
dence in them.
The thrust of military policy has now been aimed at
the mainstream of the services, the great majority of men and
women who are worthy of and can carry the responsibility of
mutual trust.
The first steps towards building a broader attitude of
mutual trust, thereby increasing an individual's fate control
was to eliminate routine sign-in and sign-out procedures, the
discontinuance of bedchecks, and the removal of many unneces-
sary formations.
The decision to allow commanders to test the practical-
ity of allowing soldiers to have beer available for purchase
from vending machines in their barracks was another policy
aimed at demonstrating trust and treating our soldiers as ma-
ture, responsible individuals. Although wrongly interpreted
by some as an act of permissiveness, the new policy simply
recognized that the dayroom in the barracks is the single
soldier's living room.
Restrictions regarding travel while on pass have also
been eliminated, partly in recognition of today's rapid means
of transportation and partly in keeping with the approach that
a soldier should be treated as a responsible adult.
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The intent and consequence of these policy changes was
not to accept unreliability or carelessness in the behavior
of today's military men. The standards of performance demanded
of soldiers have not been compromised. Accordingly, what has
changed is the expectation that the AVF as an institution mani-
fests toward its soldiers. The AVF today seeks a discipline
which grows from within each member, a self-discipline developed
by regarding each member as dependable. These intangible in-
centives inspire and promote self-discipline. These features
also provide the AVF with a durable source of strength to at-
tract qualified personnel into military service.
!S. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
"The importance placed^on educational and training benefits
has had a great effect upon enlisting qualified personnel into
the military services.
In a research report entitled "Trends in Enlistment Motiva-
tion," these factors were again evident of the values youth
placed on these areas of interest. During the period April,
1971, to April, 1972, a questionnaire was administered to all
male enlistees at twenty-five Armed Forces entrance and exami-
nation stations. The total sample consisted of 26,853 volun-
tary accessions to the enlisted force. The first twelve ques-
tions requested respondents to rank each of twelve reasons
that may have influenced them to join the services on a scale
of either strong influence, some influence, or no influence.
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The results showed, approximately 65% of the total sample, that
the most frequently endorsed reason attributable for enlist- \rL\
ment was to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life
(Fisher and Harford, 1973). J
Accordingly, education can also be an important method that
can be more fully utilized by the services to enhance enlist-
ment of competent individuals to join the military. These
specific aspects of vocational training can be coupled with
a formal educational program so that the recruiter possesses
more flexibility in enlisting the best available talent sought
by the services.
1. Cooperative Education
It is conceivable that the first term enlistee may be
given a wide range of options concerning a two-year or four-
year educational program. The problem will be to develop one
which will attract that group of quality individuals interested
in a civilian education program and at the same time keep costs
down to an acceptable figure to the military services. The
most attractive to the prospective recruit would be a fully-
funded program. However, this would be more costly from the
military viewpoint than military training. As a result, a
partially-funded program could be developed to meet cost ef-
fectiveness criteria and still be very attractive to this
group of individuals who might otherwise may not have been
interested in joining the service.
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However, if a cooperative education program were made
available to select high quality mental Category I and II
personnel, then it should prove to be very favorable in a rela-
tive cost comparison. In other words, if a cooperative educa-
tion program could increase the total number of enlistments,
and, more importantly, the number of quality (Category I and
II) enlistments, the civilian training costs would not have
to exactly match the cost of training conducted by the military
establishment in order to be cost effective. Although not com-
pletely necessary, it would be less costly if the soldier was
assigned to the closest military installation for active duty.
However, the soldier could be required to pay for his own tra-
vel, thereby alleviating the military of additional expenses.
The prospects of additional enlistments has a very
definite value and the increased quality has an intangible
value. Both factors should be used to offset the increased
cost of civilian training in relation to military training.
There is a good indication that the military would
look favorably towards a program which produced better edu-
cated soldiers. With that in mind, an option could be devel-
oped which would provide military job qualification training
in lieu of Advanced Individual Training. The two-year voca-
tional training colleges are very suitable for this purpose.
This could be further enhanced if colleges developed special
courses oriented towards a specific military job skill.
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Under this proposed program, the recruiter would be
required to seek young men or women meeting the quality stan-
dards (Category I and II) for the program and also the other
requirements for the same MOS. Ideally, recent high school
graduates would enlist, attend basic training, and then attend
the civilian college.
Due to the fact that participants in this program would
be restricted to High School Graduate Category I and II, it is
envisioned they would encounter little or no difficulty in
meeting the military job requirements.
Another promising aspect to this approach would be to
tie the enlistment option to a reserve commitment while the
individual is in college. In this way, the individual would have
a part-time job in a reserve organization. During this educa-
tional period, they would also be able to take advantage of this
opportunity to learn the military portion of their future jobs.
Of course, the reserve unit should be located near the college
for the sake of convenience and expediency.
In order to properly develop this program into a viable
enlistment incentive, it should be well planned and managed
throughout the higher echelons of the Department of Defense.
A pertinent and definitive sales approach should be developed
in the field by recruiters while necessary coordination with
colleges is carried out by the higher levels of DOD management.
In addition, administrative details between the reserve com-
ponents and the active service could be accomplished rather
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easily. This enlistment option can also be developed to entice
combat arms and other critical specialty ratings into longer
enlistments necessary for the adequate operation of the services.
Ancillary programs could also benefit by this option if devel-
oped prior to total involvement. An example of this would be
the increased emphasis that could be placed on the high school
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Testing Pro-
gram. High school teachers and counselors could be influenced
by seeing the testing program as a scholarship test, if proper
merchandising techniques were used. With proper publicity,
this program could increase not only the quality of enlistments,
but also the total annual recruiting production of the recruit-
ing commands.
There are, no doubt, other alternatives which would
increase enlistments. Attacking the problem at the other end
of the quality spectrum is usually discussed and favored by
some. By lowering either the mental or physical qualification
requirements, an immediate surge of enlistments becomes avail-
able. However, this also has cost implications. Lower quality
enlistees have always resulted in a higher rate of early dis-
charges. The increased cost of wasted training, as well as pay,
for a program which reduces entry standards should be compared
with the increased training costs of a cooperative education




Today, there is a need to increase the awareness in
young men and women of the patriotic aspects of serving one's
country. This program would lend itself to just such an ad-
vertising campaign.
C. PAY
It has been a widely accepted postulate since the advent of
the All-Volunteer Force concept that raises in military com-
pensation offer the most direct means for increasing the num-
bers of young men who apply for enlistment.
An important assumption underlying the incentive interven-
tion approach is that "more is better." This concept mainly
encompasses the belief that when greater societal value is at-
tached to particular incentives, these incentives are construed
to be more effective. The manpower projections developed by the
Gates Commission determined this to be true. The commission's
report estimated that a 10% increase in basic military pay would
result in 12.5% increase in the enlistment rate, while a 40%
pay raise would result in a 4 9% increase in the number of volun-
tary enlistees (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Force, 1970)
.
Additional studies conducted in the area of military en-
listment behavior and pay have rendered similar results. For
instance, a comprehensive study entitled "An Econometric Anal-
ysis of Volunteer Enlistments by Service and Cost Effective-
ness Comparison of Service Incentive Programs" was conducted
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for the Defense Manpower Commission for the period 1958
through midyear 1974. The study indicated that basic pay
increases can be used effectively to increase accessions.
The study suggests that a 10% increase in basic pay could
yield as much as a 14% increase in enlistment, while a 4 0%
increase could yield a 56% increase in enlistments (Grissmer
et. al., 1974)
.
The study supports the Gates Commission finding that basic
pay increases or decreases can significantly influence volun-
tary enlistments. Furthermore* assuming the same relationship
between basic pay increases and enlistment behavior will per-
tain to the target population in 1985, an increase of 17% in
basic pay alone will be needed to eliminate the projected
19,000 male shortfall (Defense Manpower Commission, 1976).
In general, this basic pay increase is a comparatively
costly response to a pending shortfall in qualified recruits.
However, further research information suggests that no single
action excepting a pay increase would be sufficient by itself
to .close the gap between projected supply and demand. Accord-
ingly, specific cost and cost-effectiveness estimates concern-
ing alternate methods of recruiting strategies have been con-
sidered (Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies, 1975)
.
Therefore, great care and discretion must be utilized in
determining the precise amount of a basic pay increase coupled





The Gates Commission recommended pay raise was large and pay
for military recruits increased 193% above inflation between
1964 and 1973. As stated earlier, however, their recommenda-
tion could have had an adverse effect if not handled properly
because of two money misconceptions (Towell, 1977) . Firstly,
managers perceive money as a prime motivator because they them-
selves are highly achievement-oriented and attach special sig-
nificance to monetary rewards. Military men and top executives
tend to be achievement-oriented and because they themselves are
particularly interested in some concrete measure that will re-
flect how well they have done, it is easy and natural for them
that the same will apply for all (McClelland, 1967)
.
Secondly, managers have a tendency to keep coming back to
money as a means of motivating people because at the practical
level it is one thing that can be easily manipulated.
In the process of developing incentives to enhance enlist-
ment another study investigated the endorsement of a set of
single incentives presented in the Gilbert Youth Survey. The
conclusion was that "more may well be slightly better." This
was based on the results that 24% of the sample endorsed a
$3,000 bonus as a likely enlistment inducement versus a 21%
endorsement of a $1,000 bonus (Fisher and Rigg, 1974) . How-
ever, the larger bonus included the proviso of enlisting in
some skill that is in short supply. This portends a different
context from the simple bonus because it also implies that
the potential recruit is considered an above average enlistee
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qualified to fill a critical skill category. Another factor
to be considered is that the enlistee would receive valuable
training while in the service.
A number of enlightening facts are presented in another
extensive research program into incentives within the Navy,
The purpose of the research was to administer a set of experi-
mental incentives to ascertain their potential worth for in-
ducing enlistment into the Navy. The random sample was com-
posed of male youth ranging in ages 16 - 22 years. One of
the approaches to test if "more is better" was to check whe-
ther increases in the absolute magnitude of single incentives
would enhance the attractiveness of the Navy.
Differences in the value of an enlistment bonus were pre-
sented since enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses have a long
history of popularity and use. Thus, the attractiveness of a
$1,000 enlistment bonus was compared to a $3,000 enlistment
bonus for the same length of engagement period. Surprisingly,
in this study, the $1,000 bonus was marginally more attrac-
tive than the $3,000 bonus. The results tentatively suggested
that the "more is sometimes worse." (Frey et. al., 1974).
Although one may first feel that the results are contrary
to common sense a number of psychological theories provide
possible explanations. First, the initial implication is that
a serious credibility gap may have been created. Thus, in-
creasing the absolute magnitude of certain incentives may




it must resort to bribes to ensure enlistment. Second, these
increased incentives may be perceived as grossly manipulative.
This would easily lead to feelings of resentment, negative
effect, and reactance against the manipulator. In fact, if a
person does indeed feel that his freedom of choice is threat-
ened, he would be less likely to enlist than without the pros-
pect of such incentives (Frey et. al., 1974).
1. Occupational Bonus
The most promising incentives reflect the same dimen-
sions that are considered to be important in civilian jobs.
The Navy is currently using re-enlistment bonuses, but not
bonuses for enlistment. The Army and Marine Corps are giving
bonuses for enlistment in the combat arms.
Pride and professionalism are at the heart of attract-
ing men to the combat arms. The job of the combat arms sol-
dier, even in peacetime is especially demanding. The Army
proposed and Congress approved a $3,000 enlistment bonus for
soldiers volunteering for the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery,
Engineer and Signal branches. The Army initially gave a $1,500
bonus, increased to $2,500 in 1974, but never gave the full
$3,000 Congress-approved bonus. These pay measures did not
indulge military men nor were they an attempt to "buy" combat
soldiers. Rather, they offer solid and credible recognition
of the special role of certain soldiers and serve as the basis




In addition, a service member may qualify for profici-
ency pay. Enlisted proficiency pay is granted to categories
of personnel on the basis of the occupational specialties in
which they are engaged. The needs of the service dictate which
groups are to be granted this bonus. However, another type of
pay incentive may also be considered feasible to induce addi-
tional enlistments into the service.
2. Performance Pay
Explicit recognition of individual performance of un-
usual qualities is generally considered to be a desirable ele-
ment in most wage and salary plans. The commitment to this
aspect of the work ethic still appears to be strong among
young people. However, no provision for individualized re-
ward for quality performance is found in our military services.
One procedure by which a performance pay system might
be introduced is to mate it with Pro-pay. It can be presumed
that budgetary considerations will enter into determination of
the feasibility of inaugurating performance pay. Therefore,
part of the budgetary allowance now assigned to Pro-pay might
be reallocated to performance pay. This is, the number of
ratings and people eligible for Pro-pay could be cut back to
free funds for performance pay. It should also be pointed out
that it would be possible to implement performance pay on a
selective basis rather than across the board. An attractive
feature of the performance pay concept is that it does not
entail guarantees to individual recruits.
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The concepts mentioned in this chapter are primarily
based upon the attitudes of civilian youth. The ability to
induce this group to enlist in military service through the




The United States All-Volunteer Armed Force must main-
tain adequate manpower levels comparable with national
security and foreign policy missions through effective
recruiting programs. During the—pro aentation of this—
thesis^ many socio-economic factors are discussed^that
,
can influence the prospects for recruiting adequate num-
bers of qualified personnel into the all-volunteer force
for the future.
The Defense Manpower Commission concluded that the
viability of sustaining the All-Volunteer Force concept
is primarily dependent upon the economic situation. Their
findings were based upon two assumptions
:
"The current relative attractiveness of service
pay, other benefits and conditions of service
will not be eroded over the next decade; and
second, that the public attitude toward the
Services and enlistments will not deteriorate."
(Defense Manpower Comm. , 1976, p. 417).
The Services have demonstrated considerable flexibility
in defining mental and educational standards in past years.
Variations in enlistment standards have traditionally been
used as a means for adjusting to varying conditions of ac-
cessions supply and demand. The same flexibility will en-
hance the prospects for recruiting qualified individuals




It appears that potential candidates for enlistment into
the military want both traditional incentives and an increased
opportunity for self-control. However, it should be noted
that these factors may be different for those of different
socio-economic backgrounds. For example, with decreasing socio-
economic status, the significance of tangible incentives becomes
stronger; while the items reflecting aspiration for fate control
become stronger with increasing socio-economic status. The
fact that there are variations in the manner that persons of
different socio-economic groupings respond to incentives re-
inforces the view that varied incentives and appeals should be
developed by the services and directed at different target po-
pulations of potential enlistees in order to maximize the re-
cruiting effort. Furthermore, incentives need to be selected
on the basis of their appropriateness and attractiveness for
specific populations to utilize their potential for influencing
enlistment decisions.
These findings indicate that a viable strategy for the
competitive appeal of the services under all-volunteer condi-
tions emphasize recruiting. In addition, serious consideration
must be given to organizational changes that provide a psycholo-
gical climate that offer potential candidates a greater degree
of personal fate control in their vocational life as well as
financial benefits. However, the differences in incentives for
different groups of potential enlistees should not obscure the
incentives common to the total target population.
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Therefore, it would be in the best interests of the ser-
vices to design specific appeals channeled through various
media aimed at different segments of today's American youth.
In addition, recruiters should be trained to fully employ this
information with greater diagnostic insight.
A competent recruiting program is essential in effecting a
viable All-Volunteer Force at a reasonable cost. This factor
becomes increasingly important and appropriate when considering
the opinion of Senator Nunn, when he stated:
"In the face of unparalleled quantitative and
qualitative expansion of Soviet forces, the
United States can no longer continue down the
road of steady contractions in its force levels
and decreasing proportions of the defense bud-
get allocated to weapons systems in order to
meet the ever-rising costs of military manpower."
(Senate Hearing, 1977, p. 2) .
These are the problems that confront policy makers and
are now considered the most crucial aspects in sustaining
the All-Volunteer Force. It is essential that steps be taken
to initiate appropriate actions and certain changes in the




Under the All-Volunteer Force concept, the key to success
is the ability to sustain the required quality and quantity
of accessions into military service. Accordingly, with the
unnecessary deterrents eliminated and positive rewards strength-
ened, the Armed Forces has become an increasingly attractive
J*
opportunity for young volunteers.
It has become imperative that the servcies heighten
the appeal of youth towards military service in an All-Volunteer
Force environment. As a result, the services must devise a
comprehensive, systematic method of attracting the quality and
quantity of volunteers its mission requires. A modernized
accession system should be developed which exercises a powerful
advertising and recruiting capability. This program can be
utilized to disseminate information concerning military service,
training and educational opportunities, benefits, and an ad-
justable array of options for service entry. These can be
accomplished through a strong and active force of impressive
person-to-person recruiting.
The Defense Manpower Commission conducted a study which
estimated the effect of intensified recruiting activities
accompanied by basic pay increases.
The efforts included the expansion of recruiting staffs,
greater advertising, and other actions designed to increase
the effectiveness of Service recruiting efforts. The study
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results suggest that accelerated recruiting efforts served
to increase the supply of accessions by stating:
"If the Servcies fail to intensify recruiting
efforts in dealing with a shortfall in the
future, the effect of any contemplated pay
increase on accessions supply could be dimin-
ished. Conversely, if the competitiveness
of military compensation is permitted to de-
cline in the future, the resulting decline in
accession rates will likely be compounded if
Service recruiting activities are constrained
simultaneously." (Defense Manpower Comm.,
1976, p. 410)
.
Therefore, greater emphasis must be placed upon advertising
through recruiting. This feature can increase the awareness
of the military as an employment option, improve understanding,
interest, and attitudes among youth in order to attract this
target population towards military service.
Advertising generates an interest for many persons to seek
additional information from one of the several services. Many
potential enlistees contact a local recruiter or call the ser-
vices 1 toll-free telephone numbers to request additional
information.
The favorable effect of a better advertised Armed Force
must be complemented by an expanded and improved recruiter
force. During the draft years, the Selective Service system
had provided for the bulk of military manpower needs. The
effort to move away from reliance upon the draft has raised
the recruiting effort to a position of paramount importance.
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Recruiting procedures and techniques have changed signifi-
cantly during the AVF years. Recruiters no longer merely pro-
cess walk-in traffic of people who decided to enlist in lieu
of induction. In order to enlist a young man or woman into
military service, recruiters must now seek out, contract and
convince a large number of potential candidates in the value
of military service. Without the pressure of the draft, many
of these individuals have no intercfet in military service. Thus,
the recruiter is of greatest value in reinforcing interest and
personally influencing preference through use of incentives in
order to secure a commitment from the individual.
In addition, a determined effort has been undertaken to
expand the size of the recruiting command while elevating its
quality. Recruiter training was made more comprehensive, and
higher standards have been applied in the selection of recruiter
personnel.
Recruiting programs have reached a point in development
that acquire potential enlistees into the service in a no-
draft environment. However, with a manpower personnel shortage
forecasted for the future, it becomes increasingly important
to consider further changes in programs, operations and
policies.
The complementary efforts of advertising and a strengthened
recruiter force are effective if they also present a variety
of attractive options for military service, carefully designed
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to fill the military's general and specific manpower needs.
A continuing development of appropriate methods of entry is
a very fundamental component in an effective system of attracting
new entrants in the needed quantity and quality. Within the
constraints of reasonable consistency, the Armed Forces must
maintain flexibility in its presentation of options for entry
while adapting alternatives to changing needs.
A method of attracting volunteers to enlist is to emphasize
and offer several options. Some of the most significant op-
tions are to allow a volunteer the freedom of choice to select
a particular location of service, military occupational special-
ty, delayed entry or unit of service thereby fostering the
sense of fate control. For example, these options prove very
attractive in ensuring service in Europe or Hawaii, perceived
job satisfaction, and a degree of self-determination.
These options can be focused on any area temporarily under-
subscribed as a flexible means of attracting potential recruits
to particular job areas and geographical locations. These op-
tions can a,lso be changed when the supply of volunteers attain
the required levels to meet the needs of the services. In
addition, this flexible approach can prove to be very advan-
tageous towards keeping hard-to-fill skills open and attractive
to volunteers.
There are additional methods that can possibly increase the
likelihood of youths becoming attracted to enlisting in mili-
tary service. For instance, a career behavior information
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system can be developed to increase the amount of information
available to potential recruits in order to reduce ambiguities
associated with selecting an occupation in the service and to
increase the appeal of the military for those persons not
interested in enlistment.
The establishment of an enlistment counseling program
within the recruiting system can provide a potential appli-
cant with a means of examining occupational options with a
professional counselor. This program could increase the man-
power pool of potential recruits and enhance the attractive-
ness of choices within the services.
The expansion of the recruiting program can publicize
educational and training opportunities throughout the mili-
tary environment. These recruiting efforts can be targeted
towards new populations previously not given a great deal of
attention. However/ enlistment incentives have different ap-
peals for different segments of society and need to be fully
evaluated to determine their effectiveness. Therefore, further
experimental evaluation should be undertaken to examine the
traditional tangible incentives and those that increase the
individual's sense of fate control. This proposal would in-
crease the cost of the AVF, but might prove to be an overall
cost savings to the government and taxpayers in the long run.
In addition, there should be an increased emphasis placed
upon the integrity of the recruiter. This program can create
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better attitudes, more trust, confidence, and foster a more
effective recruiting tool among youths towards enlisting in
the armed services. This feature may result in many prospec-
tive recruits not becoming disenchanted with military service
and convey these feelings in the form of negative feedback to
other prospective recruits among friends and relatives.
In summary, the Armed Forces recruiting system should be
updated to meet the demands and needs of potential candidates
interested in enlistment. This process should attract quality
personnel to the recruiting commands. It should also place the
necessary emphasis on advertising and recruiting, thereby im-
proving the attitude of youths toward the services* image.
Ultimately, it should provide flexibility to the enlistee
concerning numerous options of entry, military training, and
increased sense of fate control.
It is important that when considering the recommended pro-
posals offered in this chapter that one does not lose sight
of the fact that the Armed Forces have a vital mission and
7
that any adopted changes must not impinge upon operational
effectiveness
.
The military can proceed with former methods, but without
change there must be doubt as to whether it can properly develop
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